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Do sanctions strengthen the targeted regime? I analyze the 2014 
imposition of Western sanctions on Russia and its impact on voting. 
The US and the EU introduced targeted measures against Russian 
entities and individuals related to Putin’s regime. Using polling 
station-level data I investigate whether Putin gained relatively more 
support among those local constituencies which were geographically 
close to a sanctioned firm. I find a significant effect of targeted 
sanction imposition on the vote share in presidential elections 
between 2012 and 2018. Putin gained 1.54 percentage points at those 
polling stations that had a sanctioned firm in immediate vicinity. 
Targeted sanctions imposition also affected voter turnout. The effect 
on voting can be explained as rally-around-the-flag in the face of 
sanctions, as long as voters did not endure economic losses through 
a decline in some sanctioned firms’ economic performance. 




Do sanctions have an unaccounted for effect of strengthening the sanctioned 
regime? According to the public choice literature, sanctions can reduce the political 
resources of the ruling elites in the target country, thereby changing the domestic 
political equilibrium and bringing about a change in policy in the direction aimed by 
the sanction senders (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1988). Specifically, the regime’s 
opposition may be encouraged by foreign sanctions and their ability to mobilize 
people to collective actions against the government may increase, or regime 
supporters may turn away from the target country rulers in anticipation of a regime 
change (Kaempfer et. al., 2004). Alternatively, sanction imposition may induce the 
target country’s citizens to reject foreign inference by increasing their support for 
the rulers and thereby reinforcing the sanctioned policy or behavior, a phenomenon 
termed “rally-around-the-flag” (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992). Aware of these 
potential unintended consequences, sanction policymakers in the last two decades 
have started applying so-called “smart” or “targeted” sanctions, i.e., sanction 
programs which meticulously target only a country’s ruler and her closest supporters 
(Tostensen, 2002; Drezner, 2011).  
Understanding the impact of this new type of sanctions is of interest not only for 
sanctions policymakers and the sanctions literature but also for models of political 
support and state legitimacy. And for those taking the decisions on sanctions, if 
smart sanctions increase the popular support of a targeted government, then 
sanctions in general may turn out to be an obsolete, ineffective foreign policy tool. 
In this paper, I empirically examine the effect of smart sanctions on the targeted 
country. In 2014, the EU and the US introduced sanctions against several hundreds 
of Russian entities and individuals.  I investigate the political consequences of these 
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sanctions on elections in Russia, between 2012 and 2018. The targeted manner of 
sanctioning created substantial geographical variation in direct exposure to 
sanctions. Russians living close to and potentially working at sanctioned firms may 
have experienced sanctions in a different way than the average Russian citizen. 
Direct exposure to local sanctioned entities may have given rise to an identity- or 
economic-based reaction. The local presence of sanctioned firms may have induced 
defiant attitudes against foreign influence and awakened or strengthened ideas of 
nationalism or identity from which Putin’s support benefits (Pape, 1997). At the 
same time, sanctioned entities may have contributed to worsening local economic 
conditions, for which Western interference could be blamed. 
This paper analyzes whether exposure to smart sanctions affects political support 
for the targeted regime. To do so, I assemble a panel of newly-collected polling 
station-level data on presidential elections and match it with geographical and 
financial data on sanctioned Russian firms. I then compare the change in Putin’s 
vote share between 2012 and 2018 for the polling stations that had a sanctioned firm 
in close vicinity after 2014’s sanctions imposition to those polling stations that did 
not. I find that local presence of a sanctioned firm significantly increased Putin’s 
vote share in the 2018 presidential elections by 1.54 percentage points. Since more 
than 11,000 polling stations (out of over 90,000) were close to at least one sanctioned 
firm in the 2018 elections, the estimated effect implies over 280,000 influenced 
voters.  
In a second part of the analysis, I show that the effect of a nearby sanctioned firm 
varies with local support for Putin. The effect is particularly strong at those polling 
stations that are the most and the least supportive of Putin. Additionally, the 
presence of a sanctioned firm increased voter turnout at those polling stations where 
Putin enjoyed highest support. The impact of sanctions on voters seems to work, at 
least in part, through mobilization of nonvoters in pro-Putin areas.   
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Pinpointing the precise mechanism that drives up Putin’s support at polling stations 
close to sanctioned firms is challenging due to the lack of disaggregated data on voter 
attitudes. To confront this challenge, this paper uses firm-level data on employment 
at sanctioned firms between 2013 and 2017. I show that the sanctioned firm effect 
on voting is only present for those firms that gain additional employees over the 
sanctions period. The effect for sanctioned firms losing employees over the same 
period is negative, albeit statistically insignificant. This may be taken as an indication 
that an identity- or nationalism-based explanation for Putin’s support is subordinate 
to a rational economic explanation. When sanctions affect one’s livelihood and 
economic prosperity, Russians may be less eager to see the blame in foreign 
interference and to rally-around-the-flag. 
My paper contributes to the literature on the domestic political impact of sanctions. 
One strand of this literature has found that sanctions lead to popular mobilization 
against the regime in the target country and policy reversal or step-down of the 
regime (Kirshner, 1997; Mack and Khan, 2000; Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000; 
Marinov, 2005). These findings have been questioned by contributions that 
demonstrate that the impact of sanctions, especially on autocratic regimes, is 
probably weak (Galtung, 1967; Lektzian and Souva, 2007, Allen, 2008; Escriba-Folch 
and Wright, 2010). Nondemocratic regimes are able to mitigate the domestic political 
costs of sanctions by increasing government spending or taking repressive measures. 
These empirical studies typically use a cross-country or a case-study approach and 
are plagued by endogeneity problems, particularly in isolating the effect of sanctions 
on domestic politics from other concurrent dynamics or factors. I improve on these 
existing contributions by providing causal identification of the impact of sanctions 
on the target country’s electoral outcomes.  
My paper is also related to the small but growing literature on targeted sanctions. 
Dreger et al. (2015) and Tuzova and Qayub (2016) use VAR models in an attempt 
to estimate the impact of Western sanctions on the Russian economy. Moret et al. 
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(2016) and Ahn and Ludema (2016) examine the change in trade flows between 
Russia and the rest of the world following sanction imposition. Whereas these 
studies give a fundamental macroeconomic perspective on how sanctions may play 
out across the economies involved in sanctions, they may be less well-suited to 
measure the impact of targeted sanctions, which are mostly affecting only specific 
entities or at most specific sectors of an economy. In this regard, Crozet and Hinz 
(2016), Haidar (2017), Ahn and Ludema (2017) and Draca et. al. (2017) take up a 
micro-level approach in determining the impact of sanctions on trade flows or 
economic performance of the sanctioned firms or sectors. Some of the findings 
support that smart sanctions have been able to negatively impact the performance 
of the entities connected to the business and political elites in Russia and Iran (Ahn 
and Ludema 2017; Draca et. al., 2017). Yet, Crozet and Hinz (2016) and Haidar 
(2017) use customs data to demonstrate that recent targeted sanctions have also had 
unintended consequences of deflecting trade flows, particularly in the cases of Russia 
and Iran. I build upon this micro-data-based research agenda on exploration of the 
impact of sanctions in the following ways. First, I compile firm-level data on 
sanctioned firms and polling-station-level data across presidential elections in order 
to explore the precise working-out of Western sanctions in Russia. Second, I 
complement the existing contributions, which focus on real economic performance 
of the sanctioned entities, whereas my paper draws implications for the sanction 
effectiveness in terms of their political consequences. This is important because, 
ultimately, whether sanctions work comes down to whether or not the targeted 
regime changes its behavior. In this regard, the economic losses endured by the 
target may prove a mixed blessing – it is both possible that the regime is split or that 
its support is reinforced (Kaempfer et. al., 2004).  
Finally, my findings may provide more insight in non-Western-centric concepts of 
statehood and legitimacy. If sanctions do not fracture the target government but 
instead increase its popular support, then it is questionable that even modern-day 
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targeted sanctions may be able to divide the masses from the elite who is to be 
punished and achieve their intended goal (Freedman, 1998).     
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief 
background on Western sanctions imposition against Russia starting 2014. In section 
3 I describe the data whereas section 4 presents the empirical specification, the 
results and robustness checks. Section 5 expands the analysis to heterogeneity effects 
and potential mechanisms. Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Sanctions background 
In 2013 Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich refused to sign an Association 
Agreement with the EU, which aimed at integrating Ukraine more closely with the 
EU. The President supported a pro-Russian orientation. His position instigated mass 
protests in Ukraine and the formation of an anti-Russian and pro-European 
movement. An Ukrainian government-led intervention against the protesters led to 
several deadly incidents. The conflict culminated with President Yanukovich fleeing 
the country and Russia invading the Crimean peninsula in March 2014. A 
referendum held at Crimea shortly thereafter affirmed the peninsula’s decision to 
join the Russian Federation. As these proceedings were not abiding by international 
law, the EU and the US imposed sanctions on Russian politicians and against specific 
economic entities in Crimea. These actions were accompanied by pro-Russian and 
pro-Ukranian protests across Ukraine and a rising polarization of the country. The 
conflict continued escalating in the eastern parts of Ukraine – Donetsk and Lugansk 
– and Russia was accused of supporting pro-Russian militant activists in those 
regions. This led to further sanctions adoption by the US and the EU against Russia. 
Russia answered with countersanctions against the sanctioning countries.       
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Sanction specifics – The US issued four Executive Orders1 between March and 
December 2014, which authorize US government institutions to impose and regulate 
sanctions against Russia. US sanctions consist of two non-exclusive categories. The 
first category, SSI (Sectoral Sanctions Identification) sanctions, are sanctions aimed 
at entities in the Russian financial, energy and defense sectors. The following 
restrictions apply for these entities: US citizens are prohibited from transacting or 
issuing debt of a maturity of more than 30 days or acquiring new assets of the 
sanctioned entities. Additionally, the transaction of certain technologies and services 
related to deep-water, offshore or shale oil activity is also prohibited. The second 
sanctions category, SDN (Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons) 
sanctions, deals with individuals and entities which are to be fully blocked from any 
economic activity with the US. 
The EU sanctions policy is quite similar to the US one and is set out in several EU 
Council Regulations.2 The EU also maintains two broad sanction categories. The 
first one, Sectoral Sanctions List, prohibits EU citizens to transact in debt or equity 
of a maturity exceeding 30 days with entities on the list. It also bans EU exports of 
deep-water, offshore or shale oil related technologies and services. The other 
category, Restricted Measures List, prohibit the issuance of visas and freezes the 
assets for all individuals featured on the list as well as prohibits any economic 
activities with entities and individuals on the list.  
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Data and construction of the dataset 
3.1.1 Elections data 
                                                            
1 Execute Order 13660 (March 6, 2014), Execute Order 13661 (March 16, 2014), Execute Order 
13662 (March 20, 2014), and Execute Order 13685 (December 19, 2014). 
2 EU Council Regulations 269/2014, 284/2014, 433/2014, 833/2014 and 960/2014. 
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Elections data comes from the Central Election Commission of the Russian 
Federation and was webscraped from the website of the Commission3, where it is 
made available at the polling station level. Address data of the polling stations for 
the 2018 presidential elections was also available from the Election Commission. 
Polling stations are formed for a period of five years. While most of them retain their 
identification number and localization across elections, some do not. In order to 
account for potential changes in polling stations between the 2012 and 2018 
elections, I use data on the addresses of the polling stations in 2012 collected by 
GIS-Lab Russia. This non-governmental organization is a society of specialists in 
geographic information systems, which runs specific geographic and remote sensing 
projects and makes their data available online.4  I then geocode the polling station 
addresses for the 2012 and 2018 presidential elections using Yandex Maps and 
Google Maps APIs. To match polling stations across elections, I use Stata’s geodist 
routine (Picard, 2010), which calculates straight-line distance between two 
geographical coordinates. Roughly 5,000 polling stations from the 2018 elections 
remain unmatched (out of 90,000). Additionally, of those matched, 3,671 of the 
polling stations matched feature a matching distance of more than 10 km. I drop 
these as unlikely or erroneous matches. I am then left with 79,922 matched polling 
stations, with an average (median) matched distance between 2012 and 2018 polling 
stations equal to 0.8 km (0.3 km) and the 95th percentile corresponding to 3.6 km 
distance between matched polling stations. The election data, consisting of votes for 
the different candidates, number of eligible voters registered and the total ballots 
cast is kept at the polling station level. 
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I identify 361 distinct firms located in Russia from the US and EU sanctions lists. 
Firms are listed with their addresses which I cross-check with firm-level data 
provided by Bureau van Dijk’s AMADEUS database. This database provider collects 
and standardizes financial and ownership data on firms located in Europe. The firms’ 
locations are geocoded using Yandex Maps and Google Maps API so that I can 
match them to polling stations across Russia. The firms are located all across Russia 
(Figure 1), however with a high prevalence in Moscow and St. Petersburg – 218 firms 
are located there, i.e. 60% of all sanctioned firms. Overall, sanctioned firms are 
located in cities of sizable population – another 29 sanctioned firms are located in 
cities with population of at least 1,000,000; 69 firms are located in mid-sized cities 
of population between 100,000 and 1,000,000 and the remaining 45 sanctioned firms 
operate from locations with population under 100,000 (Table 1).  
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TABLE 1: POPULATION SIZE BY SANCTIONED FIRM LOCALITY 
Population at sanctioned firm location Frequency % Cum. % 
Population > 2,000,000 218 60.39 60.39 
1,000,000 < Population <= 2,000,000 29 8.03 68.42 
100,000 < Population <= 1,000,000 69 19.11 87.53 
Population < 100,000 45 12.47 100.00 
Total 361 100.00  
 
Most of the sanctioned firms are small to mid-sized firms, with three-quarters of the 
firms with less than 1,000 employees in 2013 (Table 2).  
 
TABLE 2: SIZE OF SANCTIONED FIRMS 
Number of employees at 
sanctioned firm in 2013 
Frequency % Cum % 
Employees < 50 53 26.11 26.11 
50 < Employees <= 1,000 102 50.25 76.35 
1,000 < Employees <= 10,000 46 22.66 99.01 
Employees > 10,000 2 0.99 100.00 
Total 203 100.00  
 
The distribution of sanctioned firm size across the largest (Moscow and St. 
Petersburg) and the smallest cities is similar, with a prevalence of small and mid-
sized sanctioned companies, whereas most of the largest sanctioned firms are located 
in cities of population between 100,000 and 2,000,000 (Table 3). 
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TABLE 3: SANCTIONED FIRM SIZE AND FIRM LOCATION 
POPULATION 
   
 Employees  
< 50 
50 <  
Employees  
<= 1,000 
1,000 <  
Employees 




Population > 2,000,000 30.83 54.14 15.04 0.00 100.00
      
1,000,000 < Population 
<= 2,000,000 
6.25 37.50 50.00 6.25 100.00 
100,000 < Population 
<= 1,000,000 
13.79 31.03 51.72 3.45 100.00 
Population < 100,000 28.00 60.00 12.00 0.00 100.00
Total 26.11 50.25 22.66 0.99 100.00
 
To assess the effect of a sanctioned firm on local voters’ support for Putin, I would 
ideally interview local voters on their political attitudes, prior and after the 
sanctioning of local firms. Unfortunately, this kind of information at such level of 
geographic detail is not available. I therefore use spatial vicinity of a local 
constituency to a sanctioned firm as a proxy for exposure. From the data described 
above, I construct several treatment variables. The main one identifies all polling 
stations which have one (or more) sanctioned firm within a radius of 10 km. There 
are 11,068 polling stations that were treated with at least one nearby sanctioned firm. 
In robustness checks I vary this distance to include only very close (within 3 km) or 
also more faraway-located (within 60 km) sanctioned firms. In addition, I construct 
a treatment variable which accounts for the potential economic intensity of 
treatment. In particular, I draw a radius of 10 km around each polling station and 
sum the number of employees at sanctioned firms within this distance. I then relate 
this number to the total population in the subregion in which the particular polling 
station is located. I thus have a measure giving me the ratio of local population 
employed at sanctioned firms. 
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3.1.3 Control variables 
The polling stations are organized in electoral districts, which match Russian 
subregions. The subregion is the lowest administrative level at which data is collected 
by Rosstat, the Russian Federal State Statistics Service. I collect demographic data 
from Rosstat’s website5 for all 2,351 subregions, which in most cases is available for 
the period 2009-2017. The variables that provide enough coverage are total 
population, as well as population shares according to age, gender, social benefits 
recipients and urbanization. To account for potential economic confounders that 
may influence both the location of a sanctioned firm and political support for Putin, 
I also collect several economic performance controls. These include goods and 
services produced, state investment in fixed assets, and average wage, all at the 
subregional level, provided by Rosstat.  
 
3.2 Summary statistics 
Table 4 presents summary statistics of the election, demographic and economic data. 
I compare polling stations that featured a sanctioned firm within 10 km distance 
(column(2)) to polling stations that did not (column (1)).  Those polling stations with 
a sanctioned firm are located in economically stronger subregions: average wages are 
higher, as is state investment per capita and the value of goods and services 
produced. The subregions in which the sanctioned polling stations are located are 
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TABLE 4: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 No sanctioned 




Election variables (polling station level)
Putin's vote share (%) in 2012 67.42 55.49 65.17 
 (11.78) (9.55) (12.31) 
  
Putin's vote share (%) in 2018 77.82 73.68 77.04 
 (8.84) (5.42) (8.46) 
  
Turnout (%) in 2012 69.18 62.19 67.86 
 (13.42) (9.16) (13.02) 
  
Turnout (%) in 2018 72.34 63.27 70.63 
 (14.21) (9.30) (13.88) 
  
Demographic variables in 2017 (subregion level) 
Population, 2017 97,788 623,332 196,774 
 (187,189) (484,454) (338,918)
    
Male (%), 2017 47.49 45.20 47.06 
 (2.03) (1.08) (2.09) 
    
Elderly (%), 2017 26.38 24.16 25.96 
 (4.45) (2.61) (4.26) 
    
Social benefit recipients (%), 2017 25.91 22.99 25.36 
 (9.30) (5.67) (8.81) 
    
Rural population (%), 2017 53.65 3.82 44.27 
 (38.31) (15.61) (40.21) 
    
Economic variables in 2017 (subregion level) 
Average wage (in RUB), 2017 26,825 48,470 30,901 
 (9,362) (18,949) (14,505) 
    
State investment in fixed assets (RUB 


















    
Demographic variables, change from 2011 to 2017 (subregion level) 
Population, change, 2017-2011 806 29,530 6,216 
 (9,458) (34,369) (20,523) 
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Male, % points change, 2017-2011 0.54 0.04 0.44 
 (0.99) (0.70) (0.96) 
    
Elderly, % points change, 2017-2011 2.69 1.17 2.41 
 (1.18) (1.28) (1.34) 
    









    










Economic variables, change from 2011 to 2017 (subregion level) 









    
State investment in fixed assets (RUB 


















Observations (number of polling 
stations) 
47,695 11,068 58,763 
 
The polling stations that have a nearby sanctioned firm increased their support for 
Putin by 18.19 percentage points (from 55.49% to 73.68%). At those polling stations 
where there are no neighboring sanctioned firms, Putin’s vote share rose by 10.40 
percentage points (from 67.42% to 77.82%). These numbers are already suggestive 
of the vote-increasing effect a sanctioned firm may have had on local constituencies 
in the presidential elections in 2018. Yet, this implication does not consider the 
difference in the number of eligible voters by polling station, nor does it account for 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. The subset “No sanctioned firm within 10km” is 
formed by the polling stations which have at least one sanctioned firm within a 10 km distance. 
The subset “Sanctioned firm within 10km” consists of those polling stations which do not have 
any sanctioned firms within a 10 km distance. Observations are unweighted. 
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the differing voting trends across demographic and economic characteristics. In my 
subsequent estimation I account for all these factors. 
The sample consists of 58,863 polling stations, out of approximately 90,000. These 
polling stations are spread across 1709 Russian subregions, out of a total of 2351 
subregions. 
 
4. Empirical specification and results 
I estimate the effect of having a sanctioned firm in close vicinity on voting behavior 
using a difference-in-difference approach. The treatment received by voters at a 
given polling station is the availability of a sanctioned firm within 10 km distance 
from the polling station. Measuring the effect of sanctioned firms involves 
comparing the changes in voting behavior of the electorate at polling stations where 
a firm is sanctioned after 2014 relative to the differences in voting behavior at those 
polling stations where no firm is sanctioned after 2014. 
The difference-in-difference approach guards against certain threats to identification 
of the treatment effect. Looking at the differences in vote share across time assures 
that time-invariant characteristics of the polling station or the voters cannot be the 
reason for the change in voting behavior. Moreover, any time-varying effects are also 
controlled for by comparing the change in vote share between treated and untreated 
polling stations. Hence, the comparison of the change in the treatment group relative 
to the control group allows me to distill the effect of the treatment. In order to be 
able to attribute the difference in changes between the two groups as the effect of 
sanctioned firms, the treatment has to be unconditionally or conditionally (based on 
controls) exogenous. Specifically, the US and the EU should not have sanctioned 
firms that are close to polling stations where voters are more likely to increase their 
support for Putin, even if there are no sanctioned firms nearby. Since the assignment 
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of polling stations in treated and unterated has not been made randomly, I explore 
the determinants of selection and pinpoint the variables predicting the occurrence 
of a sanctioned firm in 2018. 
The firms that have been sanctioned by the US and EU starting 2014 may be located 
in areas that feature strong support for Putin. Indeed, the proclaimed aim of the US 
and the EU has been to use sanctions to hurt Russian political and business elites, 
who support the Russian annexation of Crimea and the Russian regime. If the 
sanctioned firms are situated next to polling stations that were becoming more pro-
Putin between 2012 and 2018, then the estimated effect of sanctioned firms in 
vicinity would be probably capturing that political trend. 
The treatment variable, ܶ10௜௝,ଶ଴ଵ଼ is a dummy variables, measured at the polling 
stations level and equal to one if there is at least one sanctioned firm within 10 km 
of the polling station; and equal to zero otherwise. To examine the determinants of 
the assignment to treatment, I estimate the following linear probability model: 
 
ܶ10௜௝,ଶ଴ଵ଼ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵݏ݄ܽݎ݁௜௝,ଶ଴ଵଶ௉௨௧௜௡ ൅ ߚଶݐݑݎ݊݋ݑݐ௜௝,ଶ଴ଵଶ௉௥௘௦.௘௟௘௖. ൅ ࢢଶ଴ଵ଻ࢄ௝,ଶ଴ଵ଻ 
൅	ࢢଶ଴ଵ଻ିଶ଴ଵଵࢄ௝,ଶ଴ଵ଻ିଶ଴ଵଵ ൅ ߝ௜௝  
(1) 
Of particular interest are the two political variables at the polling station level – 
Putin’s vote share in 2012, ݏ݄ܽݎ݁௜௝,ଶ଴ଵଶ௉௨௧௜௡  , and voter turnout, equal to the ratio of 
votes cast to eligible voters at polling station i in subregion j (in percentage), 
ݐݑݎ݊݋ݑݐ௜௝,ଶ଴ଵଶ௉௥௘௦.௘௟௘௖.. Further determinants of the treatment are demographic and 
economic variables measured at the subregion level. These are the set of controls for 
2017 - ࢄ௝,ଶ଴ଵ଻ and the set of changes in controls between 2011 and 2017, 
ࢄଶ଴ଵ଻ିଶ଴ଵଵ. To account for the different number of eligible voters across polling 
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stations I weigh the observations by number of eligible voters at a polling station in 
2012.6 I cluster the standard errors at the subregion level. 
 
The results of this estimation are presented in Table 5. In column (1), I first estimate 
the linear probability model without controls and fixed effects. The presence of a 
sanctioned firm is positively and statistically significantly related to turnout and 
negatively and statistically significantly related to Putin’s vote share in 2012. Adding 
demographic characteristics to the estimation (column (2)) reduces the magnitude of 
those relationships as does the addition of economic controls (column (3)). Next, I 
include subregion fixed effects (column (4)). This specification accounts for the 
determinants of within-subregion location of sanctioned firms, controlling at the 
same time for demographic and economic characteristics. Although the coefficients 
on the political variables are still statistically significant, the addition of the 
geographic fixed effects further lowers both political variables coefficients to 
magnitudes which are close to zero. Moreover, polling stations with higher pro-Putin 
vote share are less likely to feature a nearby sanctioned firm – the estimated 
coefficient is -.001. Running an F-test for statistical significance of all demographic 
or all economic controls shows that I cannot reject the hypothesis that these control 
variables are zero (F-test = 0.95 / 0.94). The presence of a sanctioned firm is 
therefore uncorrelated with demographic and economic variables once geographic 
heterogeneity is accounted for and negatively related to voters’ support for Putin. 
While sanctioned firms tend to be present in more urban and economically vibrant 
areas (see Table 1), the assignment to polling stations within a subregion is plausibly 
random. In the last column (5) I examine the impact of voting trends prior treatment 
on the predictability of sanctioned firm occurrence. The vote share change for 
United Russia7 between the two presidential elections in 2008 and 2012 is not 
statistically significant. 
                                                            
6 The results remain qualitatively similar when I weigh the observations by the number of eligible 
voters in 2018 or by the number of total votes cast at a polling station in 2012 or 2018. 
7 Dmitry Medvedev and not Vladimir Putin was the party’s candidate in 2008 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 4.1 Main result 
I compare polling stations featuring at least one sanctioned firm within 10 km 
distance (ܶ10௜௝,ଶ଴ଵ଼=1) to polling stations with no sanctioned firms within 10 km 
distance (ܶ10௜௝,ଶ଴ଵ଼=0). I am interested in examining the impact of sanctioning a 
nearby firm on the change in Putin’s vote share at the polling station level between 
2012 and 2018. Sanctions were adopted starting 2014. My specification is as follows: 
 
ݏ݄ܽݎ݁௜௝,ଶ଴ଵ଼௉௨௧௜௡ െ	ݏ݄ܽݎ݁௜௝,ଶ଴ଵଶ௉௨௧௜௡ 	ൌ 	ߙ ൅	ߚଵܶ10௜௝,ଶ଴ଵ଼ ൅ ࢢଶ଴ଵ଻ࢄ௝,ଶ଴ଵ଻ 
൅	ࢢଶ଴ଵ଻ିଶ଴ଵଵࢄ௝,ଶ଴ଵ଻ିଶ଴ଵଵ ൅ ߝ௜௝  
(2) 
Similar to the specification examining the determinants of sanctioned firm 
availability, I again control for subregion-level demographic and economic 
characteristics in levels (ࢄ௝,ଶ଴ଵ଻) and in changes (ࢄ௝,ଶ଴ଵ଻ିଶ଴ଵଵ). I weight the 
observations by the number of eligible voters at the polling station level in 2012 and 
cluster the standard errors at the subregion level. 
Table 6 exhibits the estimation results. Absent of controls or fixed effects, the 
difference-in-difference estimation shows that on average, the overall support for 
Putin in my sample increased by over 12% (ߙො ൌ 12.006). Relative to this overall 
shift, polling stations with a nearby sanctioned firm increased their vote share for 
Putin by 6.72% relative to polling stations without a nearby sanctioned firm, a 
statistically significant result. Including demographic controls in column (2) almost 
halves the magnitude of the estimate of the sanctioned firm presence to 3.99%, but 
it remains statistically significant. In column (3), I add economic controls which 
further lowers the magnitude of the sanctioned firm effect, leaving it statistically 
significant. Finally, in the benchmark specification in column (4), I include subregion 
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fixed effects, in addition to all control variables. This specification accounts for 
unobservable trends in voting behavior common to a subregion that may be 
correlated with the presence of a sanctioned firm. The effect of a sanctioned firm 
on voting is identified by comparing neighboring polling stations with and without 
sanctioned firms, within the same subregion. The estimated effect is more precise 
than in the other specifications (columns (1)-(3)) and is positive, statistically 
significant and sizable, at 1.54%. 
 
Table 6: THE EFFECT OF SANCTIONED FIRMS ON 2012-2018 PUTIN'S 
VOTE SHARE CHANGE 
Dependent variable: Putin’s vote share change between 2018 and 2012 presidential elections 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 











Constant 12.006*** 54.683*** 36.744*** -9.820 
 (0.264) (7.003) (8.086) (53.048) 
Demographic controls no yes yes yes 
Economic controls no no yes yes 
Subregion FE no no no yes 
R-squared 0.107 0.197 0.225 0.568 
N 58763 58763 58763 58763 
 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is polling station. The dependent variable is (Putin’s vote share 
for the 2018 presidential election) - (Putin’s vote share for the 2012 presidential election). The 
variable “Sanctioned firm within 10 km” is a binary variable that equals one if there is a 
sanctioned firm within 10 km distance from the polling station. The demographic controls are 
population, shares of males, elderly and social benefits recipients in the total population and 
rural population share, all measured at the subregion level and made available by Rosstat, present 
both in the 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. The economic controls are 
average wage, state investment in fixed assets per capita and goods and services produced, all 
measured at the subregion level and provided by Rosstat, used in the estimation both in 2017 
values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by 
subregion. The observations are weighted by the number of eligible voters at the polling station 
level in the 2012 presidential election. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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4.2 Robustness 
In the following, I test the robustness of the above results to alternative definitions 
of the treatment variable as well as to placebo treatments. 
Up to now, the definition of the treatment variable - exposure to a sanctioned firm 
– was fixed to a radius of ten kilometers around the polling station. This choice has 
been guided by the average commuting distance from one’s home to work. Yet, my 
sample features firms in very heterogeneous settings – from the multimillion 
inhabitant cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg to rural settlements in the Northeast 
of Russia. The median distance travelled to work in the Moscow region was 30 
kilometers (with an average of 50 km, Shitov & Shitova, 2017) and this distance 
declines with smaller localities (SuperJob, 2015) to around 6 km in rural settlements 
(Yandex, 2016).  
In order to check if my results hold against different specifications of the exposure, 
I now vary the definition of treatment down to 3 km and up to 60 km distance from 
a polling station. The results are presented in Table 7, columns (1) and (2). The 
positive effect of vicinity to a sanctioned firm on Putin’s vote share remains about 
the same for a distance of 60 km (ߚଵ෢ ൌ 1.586) while it decreases for the smaller 
distance of 3 km (ߚଵ෢ ൌ 0.467). One explanation for the strong effect at even higher 
distances follows from the structure of the sample of sanctioned firms. About 60 % 
of the firms that have been sanctioned in 2014 are located in Moscow or St. 
Petersburg. These are cities that attract commuters from afar while also featuring 
denser presence of sanctioned firms than any other locations in the sample. The 
effect of the existence of a sanctioned firm might have thus spilled over to more 
distant neighboring areas. Finally, it is reassuring to see that the main result remains 
valid and statistically significant with the very tight definition of exposure to 
treatment of 3 km (column (2)). 
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TABLE 7: ROBUSTNESS 
Dependent variable: Putin’s vote chare change between 2018 and 2012 presidential 
elections 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




   
    
     





    
  
Share of subregion 
population (%), working at 
sanctioned firm(s) within 10 
km in 2012 
  0.080* 
(0.047) 
 
    
  
Sanctioned firm within 10 
km 
   1.640*** 
(0.380) 
 
Demographic controls yes yes yes yes 
Economic controls yes yes yes yes 
Subregion FE yes yes yes yes 
Unweighted no no no yes 
R-squared 0.568 0.567 0.567 0.509 
N 58763 58763 58763 58763 
Notes: The unit of observation is polling station. The dependent variable is (Putin’s vote 
share for the 2018 presidential election) - (Putin’s vote share for the 2012 presidential 
election). The variables “Sanctioned firm within 60 km” and “Sanctioned firm within 3 km” 
are binary variables that equal one if a sanctioned firm is within 60 km or 3 km distance 
from a polling station, respectively. The variable “Share of subregion population (%), 
working at sanctioned firm(s) within 10 km in 2012” measures the percentage share of the 
population of the subregion, to which the polling station belongs to, that works at 
sanctioned firms located in 10 km vicinity of the specific polling station in 2012. Data on 
employment at sanctioned firms was put together from Bureau van Dijk’s AMADEUS 
database. The demographic controls are population, shares of males, elderly and social 
benefits recipients in the total population and rural population share, all measured at the 
subregion level and made available by Rosstat, present both in the 2017 values and in 
differences between 2017 and 2011. The economic controls are average wage, state 
investment in fixed assets per capita and goods and services produced, all measured at the 
subregion level and provided by Rosstat, used in the estimation both in 2017 values and in 
differences between 2017 and 2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by subregion. The 
observations are weighted by the number of eligible voters at the polling station level in the 
2012 presidential election. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Second, I also consider the number of workers employed at all sanctioned firms 
within 10 km of a given polling station, relative to the total population at the 
subregion level. Because the sanctioned firms vary in size, the number of employees 
directly affected by a sanction also varies substantially (mean employment at a 
sanctioned firm in 2012 = 159; median = 939). This variation in direct exposure 
suggests variation in treatment effects. Larger firms may imply stronger effects 
because they reach a wider part of the constituency through their employees and 
their families. Larger firms may also attract more public attention and media 
coverage, through which the awareness about the sanctioning of a specific firm may 
have been carried to a wider audience. The results from a specification with the 
percentage of subregion population employed at a sanctioned firm is shown in 
column (3) of Table 4. The effect of the treatment is positive, albeit less precisely 
estimated than the effect from my benchmark regression, which uses a simple 
dummy. 
Finally, in column (4) I show that differences in the number of eligible voters across 
polling stations are not driving the results. The estimated effect of the occurrence of 
a sanctioned firm within 10 km of a polling station on Putin’s vote share remains 
about the same (ߚଵ෢ ൌ 1.640) when running an unweighted regression. 
Next, I explore the possibility that unobservable confounding variables are 
determining both the location of sanctioned firms and the voting behavior of the 
electorate. Specifically, I design a placebo test and test whether the availability of a 
sanctioned firm within 10 km of a polling station in 2018 predicts changes in voting 
behavior between 2008 and 2012. There should be no effect as there were no 
sanctioned firms in Russia prior to 2014. Table 8 reveals that while the occurrence 
of a sanctioned firm in 2018 has a predictive power for voting behavior change 
between the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, the effect is negative. This implies 
that there might be some unobservable features that are related both to the location 
of a sanctioned firm and the tendency of voters to support Putin; however, these 
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omitted characteristics seem to be working against finding a positive effect between 
2012 and 2018, as the sign of the estimated relationship is negative (ߚଵ෢ ൌ െ1.579).  
 
TABLE 8: PLACEBO REGRESSION 
Dependent variable: United Russia’s vote share change between 2012 and 2008 presidential 
elections 
 





Demographic controls yes 




The negative effect can also be explained by the unavailability of address information 
on the location of the 2008 polling stations. While many of the polling stations’ 
locations and numbering are kept across elections, some polling stations do change 
their location, some are closed down and others are opened at new places. Thus, the 
2008 polling stations have been matched to the rest of the elections data only based 
on their subregion information and polling station number. This method is prone to 
errors and may account for the negative effect that I find. To address this challenge, 
I aggregate the data to the next administrative level – subregion – and redo the 
Notes: The unit of observation is polling station. The dependent variable is (United Russia’s vote 
share for the 2012 presidential election) - (United Russia’s vote share for the 2008 presidential 
election). The variable “Sanctioned firm within 10 km” is a binary variable that equals one if a 
sanctioned firm is within 10 km distance from the polling station. The demographic controls 
are population, shares of males, elderly and social benefits recipients in the total population and 
rural population share, all measured at the subregion level and made available by Rosstat, present 
both in the 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. The economic controls are 
average wage, state investment in fixed assets per capita and goods and services produced, all 
measured at the subregion level and provided by Rosstat, used in the estimation both in 2017 
values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by 
subregion. The observations are weighted by the number of eligible voters at the polling station 
level in the 2012 presidential election. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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placebo analysis. The results in Table A.1 demonstrate that the presence of a 
sanctioned firm within the boundaries of a subregion in 2018 does not influence 
voting behavior between 2008 and 2012.  
 
4.3 Magnitude of the effect 
My benchmark specification indicates that the presence of a sanctioned firm within 
10 km distance of a polling station had a significant impact on Putin’s vote share in 
the 2018 presidential elections. The benchmark estimate from Table 5, column (4) 
implies a confidence interval of (0.790; 2.294).  In what follows, I offer an 
interpretation of the magnitude of the estimated effects. 
The average shift in favor of Putin in my sample is equal to 12.006 percentage points, 
with a standard deviation of 9.706. The impact of a sanctioned firm is equal to about 
one-sixth of the standard deviation, a reasonably sizable effect.  
Additionally, I estimate the likely number of voters that shifted their votes to support 
Putin. By 2018, there were 11,068 polling stations which featured at least one 
sanctioned firm within a 10 km distance. A total of 18,615,116 votes were cast at 
those particular polling stations. Abstracting from voter turnout changes, these 
numbers imply that 0.01543*18,615,116 ൎ 287,231 voters shifted their votes from 
other candidates to Putin. 
 
5. Heterogeneous effects and potential mechanisms 
I have established that the presence of a sanctioned firm close to a polling station 
increases the electoral support for Putin. In this section, I analyze the potential 
mechanisms driving this effect. I start with an exploration of the heterogeneous 
effects of the treatment depending on support for Putin in the 2018 elections and 
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across different geographic areas. I then look at the impact of sanctioned firms on 
mobilization of voters. Lastly, I exploit the rich firm-level information on the 
sanctioned firms to examine the most likely case for the treatment effect. 
 
5.1 Heterogeneous effects 
I examine how the sanctioned firm effect interacts with the political positions of 
local constituencies. In order to do so, I split the polling stations into thirds, 
depending on their support for Putin in the 2018 presidential elections. I then 
interact the treatment dummy for sanctioned firm within 10 km with the bottom 
and the top third of pro-Putin-voting polling stations. Table 9 reports the results 
from this estimation. Both interaction terms are positive and statistically significant 
- the impact of a sanctioned firm is higher not only in those communities that are 
most supportive of Putin but also across those polling stations where Putin enjoys 
the least support. These results imply that the imposition of a sanction on a local 
firm not only increases the support for the regime among supporters but also 
convinces previous opponents to vote pro-Putin. 
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Table 9: INTERACTIONS 
Dependent variable: Putin’s vote share change between 2018 and 2012 presidential elections 
  
Sanctioned firm within 10km 1.072*** 
 (0.374) 
  
Most supportive of Putin polling station 4.659*** 
 (0.217) 
  





Least supportive of Putin polling station -3.622*** 
 (0.161) 
  





Demographic controls yes 
Economic controls yes 
Subregion FE yes 
R-squared 0.614 
N 58763 
Next, I test how locality characteristics influence the effect of a sanctioned firm on 
voting behavior. Most of the sanctioned firms are situated in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg (60% of all sanctioned firms) and these two cities are quite distinct in 
Notes: The unit of observation is polling station. The dependent variable is (Putin’s vote share 
for the 2018 presidential election) - (Putin’s vote share for the 2012 presidential election). The 
variable “Sanctioned firm within 10 km” is a binary variable that equals one if a sanctioned firm 
is within 10 km distance from the polling station. The dummy variables “Most supportive of 
Putin polling station” and “Least supportive of Putin polling station” are constructed by 
dividing the 58763 polling station observations into thirds based on Putin’s vote share in the 
2018 presidential elections. The variable “Most supportive of Putin polling station” indicates a 
polling station in the top third. The variable “Least supportive of Putin polling station” indicates 
a polling station in the bottom third. The omitted category indicates the middle third. 
 The demographic controls are population, shares of males, elderly and social benefits recipients 
in the total population and rural population share, all measured at the subregion level and made 
available by Rosstat, present both in the 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. 
The economic controls are average wage, state investment in fixed assets per capita and goods 
and services produced, all measured at the subregion level and provided by Rosstat, used in the 
estimation both in 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. Robust standard 
errors are clustered by subregion. The observations are weighted by the number of eligible 
voters at the polling station level in the 2012 presidential election. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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terms of political trends from the rest of Russia. For example, the two megacities 
show the highest levels of support for oppositional parties (Dmitriev and Treisman, 
2012; Lankina and Voznaya, 2015). To check whether there are any differences in 
the impact of the availability of a nearby sanctioned firm on voting behavior between 
Moscow and St. Petersburg and the rest of Russia, I subset the sample along these 
two geographic groups. The results, which are reported in Table 10, show that the 
main result of this paper is indeed driven by voting behavior shift outside the two 
largest Russian cities. While the direction, strength and significance of the sanctioned 
firm presence coefficient remains about the same for the sample subset without 
Moscow and St. Petersburg, it becomes insignificant when I run the regression on 
the two cities only. The political divide between the urban and progressive Moscow 
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Table 10: GEOGRAPHICAL HETEROGENEITY 
Dependent variable: Putin’s vote share change between 2018 and 2012 presidential elections 
 No Moscow and St. 
Petersburg 
Moscow and St. 
Petersburg only 
 (1) (2) 
 





 (0.416) (0.468) 
Demographic controls yes yes 
Economic controls yes yes 
Subregion FE yes yes 
R-squared 0.536 0.306 
N 54537 4226 
 
5.2 Voter mobilization or vote swings? 
Up until now, I have shown that sanctioned firms led to rise in support for Putin. 
However, this observation alone does not explain how Putin’s increased success 
came about. In what follows, I examine whether the approval came from other 
parties’ voters switching to United Russia (the party Putin is affiliated with), or from 
new voters that were attracted to cast their vote following the sanction imposition. 
It is possible that business and political elites who backed the regime and who were 
Notes: The unit of observation is polling station. The subset “No Moscow and St. Petersburg” is 
formed by the polling stations in all regions but Moscow and St. Petersburg. The subset 
“Moscow and St. Petersburg only” is the complementary subset. The dependent variable is 
(Putin’s vote share for the 2018 presidential election) - (Putin’s vote share for the 2012 
presidential election). The variable “Sanctioned firm within 10 km” is a binary variable that equals 
one if a sanctioned firm is within 10 km distance from the polling station. The demographic 
controls are population, shares of males, elderly and social benefits recipients in the total 
population and rural population share, all measured at the subregion level and made available by 
Rosstat, present both in the 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. The 
economic controls are average wage, state investment in fixed assets per capita and goods and 
services produced, all measured at the subregion level and provided by Rosstat, used in the 
estimation both in 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. Robust standard errors 
are clustered by subregion. The observations are weighted by the number of eligible voters at 
the polling station level in the 2012 presidential election. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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among the owners or managers of the sanctioned firms tried to mobilize local 
nonvoters to vote in favor of Putin. Indeed, there were several reports of “corporate 
mobilization” attempts across Russian state-owned enterprises, which were 
supposedly charged with the task to get out the votes.8 To test whether the 
significant impact of sanctioned firms comes from voter mobilization or voter 
switches, I employ the following voter turnout specification: 
 
ݐݑݎ݊݋ݑݐ௜௝,ଶ଴ଵ଼௉௥௘௦.௘௟௘௖. െ 	ݐݑݎ݊݋ݑݐ௜௝,ଶ଴ଵଶ௉௥௘௦.௘௟௘௖.	 
ൌ 	ߙ ൅	ߚଵܶ10௜௝,ଶ଴ଵ଼ ൅ ߚଶሺ݈݁݅݃. ݒ݋ݐ݁ݎݏ௜௝,ଶ଴ଵ଼௉௥௘௦.௘௟௘௖. െ 	݈݁݅݃. ݒ݋ݐ݁ݎݏ௜௝,ଶ଴ଵଶ௉௥௘௦.௘௟௘௖.ሻ 
൅	ࢢଶ଴ଵ଻ࢄ௝,ଶ଴ଵ଻൅	ࢢଶ଴ଵ଻ିଶ଴ଵଵࢄ௝,ଶ଴ଵ଻ିଶ଴ଵଵ ൅ ߝ௜௝  
 (3) 
where ݐݑݎ݊݋ݑݐ௜௝,௧௉௥௘௦.௘௟௘௖. is the percentage total votes at polling station i, in subregion 
j, in year ݐ ∈ ሼ2012, 2018ሽ. I control for the change in the number of eligible voters 
ሺ݈݁݅݃. ݒ݋ݐ݁ݎݏ௜௝,ଶ଴ଵ଼௉௥௘௦.௘௟௘௖. െ	݈݁݅݃. ݒ݋ݐ݁ݎݏ௜௝,ଶ଴ଵଶ௉௥௘௦.௘௟௘௖.ሻ, as well as for the usual economic 
and demographic characteristics of subregions. 
Comparing polling stations with and without a sanctioned firm within 10 km 
distance suggests that these voter mobilization groups may have been successful in 
attracting new voters. Table 11 shows that at polling stations with a sanctioned firm, 
voter turnout increased, but the estimated effect is not statistically significant. When 
I disaggregate the effect of a sanctioned firm according to the level of support for 
                                                            
8 See newspaper reports from Kommersant (На выборах задействуют корпоративный ресурс, 
February, 26, 2017, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3227902 ), Vedomosti (Кремль начал 
мониторинг экономических событий, влияющих на региональные настроения, February 27, 
2017, https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2017/02/27/679036-kreml-monitoring ) and 
Washington Post (Yes, the Kremlin is worried — about Russia's own presidential elections, 
December 6, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/12/06/yes-
the-kremlin-is-worried-about-russias-own-presidential-
elections/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.baa567e429b2 ) 
32                                                                               Did sanctions help Putin? 
 
Putin at the polling station, I find evidence that the turnout effect is quite strong and 
statistically significant at those polling stations that are most in favor of Putin. 
Combining this finding with the evidence from Table 9 implies that sanction 
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Table 11: TURNOUT 
Dependent variable: Voter turnout 
 (1) (2) 
Sanctioned firm within 10 km 1.054  
 (1.032)  
 
Change in eligible voters (%), 2012-2018 0.929*** 0.930*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
 
   
Sanctioned firm within 10km  0.705 
 (1.070) 
   
   
Most supportive of Putin polling station 7.703*** 
  (0.487) 
   
 
Sanctioned firm within 10km # Most supportive 




   
   
Least supportive of Putin polling station -1.825*** 
  (0.333) 
   
 
Sanctioned firm within 10km # Least supportive 




Demographic controls yes yes 
Economic controls yes yes 
Subregion FE yes yes 
R-squared 0.877 0.880 








Notes: The unit of observation is polling station. The dependent variable is the percentage change in total votes cast between 
2012 and 2018 presidential elections. The variable “Change in eligible voters (%), 2012-2018” indicates the percentage 
change in eligible voters registered at a given polling station between 2012 and 2018. The variable “Sanctioned firm within 
10 km” is a binary variable that equals one if a sanctioned firm is within 10 km distance from the polling station. The dummy 
variables “Most supportive of Putin polling station” and “Least supportive of Putin polling station” are constructed by 
dividing the 58763 polling station observations into thirds based on Putin’s vote share in the 2018 presidential elections. 
The variable “Most supportive of Putin polling station” indicates a polling station in the top third. The variable “Least 
supportive of Putin polling station” indicates a polling station in the bottom third. The omitted category indicates the middle 
third. The demographic controls are population, shares of males, elderly and social benefits recipients in the total population 
and rural population share, all measured at the subregion level and made available by Rosstat, present both in the 2017 
values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. The economic controls are average wage, state investment in fixed assets 
per capita and goods and services produced, all measured at the subregion level and provided by Rosstat, used in the 
estimation both in 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by subregion. 
The observations are weighted by the number of eligible voters at polling station level in the 2012 presidential election. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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5.3 Potential mechanism 
The literature examining voters’ support for Putin puts forward several explanations. 
One strand of research maintains the economic performance hypothesis, i.e., the 
Russian public assesses the performance of the political elite based on objective 
economic performance measures (Rose, Mishler and Munro, 2011; Treisman, 2011). 
Others underline the importance of control over media in Russia as well as the active 
hindrance of political challengers eager to join the political system (Enikolopov et. 
al., 2011, 2016; Robertson, 2017). In exploring the attitudinal changes of the 
electorate under extraordinary conditions one could distill the most likely 
foundations of a regime support. Sanctions imposition provide a useful opportunity 
to test whether in moments of international crisis Russians are prone to “rally-
around-the-flag”.  
In order to discern between competing explanations for the increased support of 
Putin at polling stations featuring a sanctioned firm, I devise the following test. I 
collect employment data for the sanctioned firms, before and after the imposition 
of sanctions.9 For every polling station, featuring more than one sanctioned firm 
within 10 km distance, I aggregate the number of employees of all the nearby 
sanctioned firms. I then split the treated polling stations in two groups – those where 
in sum, sanctioned firms within 10 km have gained additional employees between 
2013 and 2017, and those where the sanctioned firms (in sum) have lost employees 
over the same period.  
ݏ݄ܽݎ݁௜௝,ଶ଴ଵ଼௉௨௧௜௡ െ	ݏ݄ܽݎ݁௜௝,ଶ଴ଵଶ௉௨௧௜௡ 	ൌ 	ߙ ൅	ߚଵܶ10௜௝,ଶ଴ଵ଼௘௠௣௟.௜௡௖௥௘௔௦௘ ൅ ߚଶܶ10௜௝,ଶ଴ଵ଼௘௠௣௟.௟௢௦௦ 
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Equation (4) is identical to the baseline specification with exception of the treatment 
variable, which is now split into treated polling stations where employment at 
sanctioned firms rose between 2013 and 2017, ܶ10௜௝,ଶ଴ଵ଼௘௠௣௟.௜௡௖௥௘௔௦௘, and those polling 
stations where employment at sanctioned firms declined during the same period, 
ܶ10௜௝,ଶ଴ଵ଼௘௠௣௟.௟௢௦௦.  By separately estimating the effects of winning and losing sanctioned 
firms, I can check whether the electorate blindly rallies around the flag or if it 
responds rationally to economic forces. Table 12 shows that only those sanctioned 
firms that continued to perform well after sanction imposition increase the vote 
share for Putin. The estimated coefficient for the sanctioned firms that lost 
employees between 2013 and 2017 is negative, albeit insignificant. 
 
Table 12: ECONOMIC EXPLANATION 
Dependent variable: Putin’s vote share change between 2018 and 2012 presidential elections 
 
Employment gain at sanctioned firms, 2017-2013 0.868* 
 (0.485) 
 
Employment loss at sanctioned firms, 2017-2013 -0.203 
 (0.548) 
Demographic controls yes 
Economic controls yes









Notes: The unit of observation is polling station. The dependent variable is (Putin’s vote share 
for the 2018 presidential election) - (Putin’s vote share for the 2012 presidential election). The 
variable “Employment gain at sanctioned firms, 2017-2013” measures the log gain in 
employment at sanctioned firms within 10 km distance from the polling station, between 2013 
and 2017. The variable “Employment loss at sanctioned firms, 2017-2013” measures the log 
loss in employment at sanctioned firms within 10 km distance from the polling station, between 
2013 and 2017. The demographic controls are population, shares of males, elderly and social 
benefits recipients in the total population and rural population share, all measured at the 
subregion level and made available by Rosstat, present both in the 2017 values and in differences 
between 2017 and 2011. The economic controls are average wage, state investment in fixed 
assets per capita and goods and services produced, all measured at the subregion level and 
provided by Rosstat, used in the estimation both in 2017 values and in differences between 2017 
and 2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by subregion. The observations are weighted by 
the number of eligible voters at the polling station level in the 2012 presidential election. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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These outcomes are meaningful in discerning the reasons for the longevity of Putin’s 
leadership in Russia. The results imply that support for the government is subject to 
positive economic performance. Russians do not blindly “rally-around-the-flag”. 
Even in hybrid regimes politicians are held accountable for the economic 
performance of the country. Exposure to a sanctioned firm is associated with higher 
levels of support for Putin, but only when those firms continue to perform well 
under the sanctions regime. 
My empirical analysis provides several principal findings. First, I find evidence that 
exposure to a sanctioned firm is associated with increased levels of support for Putin. 
Moreover, I established that there has been a mobilization of nonvoters as well as 
switch of voters from the anti-Putin polling stations voting in favor of Putin in the 
2018 elections, when there was a nearby sanctioned firm. This evidence is supportive 
of the “rally-around-the-flag” hypothesis, but as this section shows, it is an 
insufficient explanation. Specifically, sanctioned firms’ performance measured by the 
percentage change in total employees between 2013 and 2017 is a strong and 
statistically significant predictor of higher support for Putin at the treated polling 
stations. The loyalty and increased support of the constituency is not irrational but 
involves sustained economic performance. I interpret these effects as supportive of 




This paper studies the political consequences of targeted sanction imposition on 
elections in Russia. In particular, I examine the impact of sanction imposition in 
2014 on the change in Putin’s vote share between 2012 and 2018. I find evidence 
that sanction imposition increased Putin’s electoral approval by 1.54 percentage 
points. This shift is sizable compared to the 13.1 percentage point overall shift in 
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support for Putin between 2012 and 2018. Heterogeneity results suggest that these 
electoral responses are stronger at those polling stations that show either relatively 
high but or particularly low support for Putin. Combined with the impact on turnout, 
I interpret the effect of sanctioned firms as mobilizing nonvoters in pro-Putin 
localities and persuading voters to switch in favor of Putin in anti-Putin areas. 
Based on firm-level employment data on the sanctioned firms, I deepen the analysis 
by testing a possible explanation for the increased vote share in favor of Putin. I 
explore if voters react to the loss of local jobs induced by sanctions.  I find that the 
upward shift in vote share for Putin is only statistically significant at those polling 
stations for which the nearby sanctioned firms experienced employment gains over 
the sanctions period. The lack of punitive reaction from voters in vicinity of 
sanctioned firms experiencing economic losses may indicate the acceptance of the 
narrative of Western responsibility and “rallying around the flag”. 
The findings have implications for understanding the impact of modern-day “smart” 
sanctions that were introduced precisely with the goal to affect only specific groups 
related to the ruling elite and prevent unintended consequences. 
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TABLE A.1: PLACEBO REGRESSION AT THE SUBREGION LEVEL 
Dependent variable: United Russia’s vote share change between 2012 and 2008 presidential 
elections 
 





Demographic controls yes 





Notes: The unit of observation is the subregion. The dependent variable is (United Russia’s vote 
share for the 2012 presidential election) - (United Russia’s vote share for the 2008 presidential 
election). The variable “Sanctioned firm within subregion” is a binary variable that equals one if 
a sanctioned firm is located within the boundaries of the subregion. The demographic controls 
are population, shares of males, elderly and social benefits recipients in the total population and 
rural population share, all measured at the subregion level and made available by Rosstat, present 
both in the 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. The economic controls are 
average wage, state investment in fixed assets per capita and goods and services produced, all 
measured at the subregion level and provided by Rosstat, used in the estimation both in 2017 
values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by region. 
The observations are weighted by the number of eligible voters at the subregion level in the 
2012 presidential election. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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